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COMMENTARY
SAVE DARFUR: A MOVEMENT AND ITS
DISCONTENTS
DAVID LANZ
‘Save Darfur’, arguably the largest international social movement since anti-
apartheid, has had an important impact in shaping the international re-
sponse to the Darfur conflict: the world’s largest humanitarian operation,
alongside one of the largest and most expensive peacekeeping missions and
a plethora of special envoys and mediators. For the first time, the US gov-
ernment has declared an ongoing conflict to be genocide and permitted the
UN Security Council to refer a case to the International Criminal Court
(ICC). In spite of these achievements (and indeed because of them), the Save
Darfur movement has been widely criticized, most publicly by Mahmood
Mamdani in his recent Saviours and Survivors.1
This commentary reviews the factors that led to the emergence of the
Save Darfur movement2 before considering its achievements, and assessing
critiques including Mamdani’s claim that Save Darfur constitutes the ‘hu-
manitarian face of the War on Terror’ and is therefore ‘a slogan that masks a
big power agenda to recolonize Africa’.3 While pointing to some of the blind
spots of advocacy efforts, Mamdani’s grandstanding arguments about the
nature of the movement are not fully convincing. Rather than a neo-colonial
project, Save Darfur is better understood as a platform through which norm
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1. Mahmood Mamdani, Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, politics, and the War on Terror (Verso,
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2. Throughout the text, ‘Save Darfur’ refers to the multitude of organizations that work to
raise awareness about and bring an end to what they consider the genocide in Darfur. Many,
but not all of these organizations are part of the official ‘Save Darfur Coalition’, founded in July
2004 in New York to coordinate Darfur advocacy efforts. See the website of the Save Darfur
Coalition, <http://www.savedarfur.org/> (all websites cited in this article were accessed on
13 July 2009).
3. Mamdani, Saviours and Survivors, pp. 6, 300.
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entrepreneurs have promoted their ideas of global governance, revealing the
perils of blindly projecting liberal norms on a complicated world.
Darfur has become the test case of the ‘responsibility to protect’ – R2P –
doctrine, the idea that the ‘international community’ has a duty to intervene
to prevent and stop mass atrocities.4 R2P is an ambitious plan for a new
world order in which sovereignty is no longer an argument against external
intervention for humanitarian purposes. It follows that the international
response to the Darfur conflict has been more concerned with the global
project to promote R2P than with the local realities of Darfur and the
imperative of peacemaking on the ground. This does not, however, mean
that Save Darfur and the so-called ‘international community’ – which is
really an amalgam of Western powers and non-governmental groups who
share a diffuse ideology based on liberal values – want to project power and
take control of Sudan, or Africa for that matter. Rather, it seeks to project
norms and promote a world order in which values trump power. While the
consequences may be equally problematic, the motivation is different.
Founding Save Darfur
Save Darfur emerged as a movement in the summer of 2004, more than
one year after the conflict in Darfur reached a point of no return. Within
a few months, Save Darfur became very influential within the US, which
begs the question of why a strategically unimportant region in Africa has
become a foremost foreign policy issue. I argue that the Save Darfur move-
ment benefited from four factors: a compelling cause, a favourable domestic
political context, determined and savvy leadership, and significant move-
ment magnifiers. First, the narrative that advocates have created is of Darfur
as a place of good and evil, victims and perpetrators, villains and heroes:
the evil Sudanese government mobilized vicious ‘Arab’ tribal militias and
induced them to commit genocide against innocent ‘African’ victims. The
heroes of this tragedy are Western aid workers, human rights activists, and
the advocates themselves who courageously save lives and speak out against
the atrocities. The forces of evil still run havoc and in order to save the
victims, who have little agency of their own, Western military intervention
is needed. This description is a caricature, but it captures the essence of the
activists’ framing of the Darfur conflict.5 As a cause therefore, Darfur was
4. For the state of the art of the doctrine, see a recent book by one of the principle architects
of R2P: Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all
(Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 2008). For the application of R2P in the context of
Darfur, see Nick Grono, ‘Briefing – The international community’s failure to protect’, African
Affairs 105, 421 (2006), pp. 621–31.
5. See Deborah Murphy, ‘Narrating Darfur: Darfur in the US press, March–September
2004’ in Alex de Waal (ed.), War in Darfur and the Search for Peace (Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 2007), pp. 314–36.
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both easy to sell and also unthreatening for the political establishment. Sec-
ond, the Darfur advocacy campaign gained momentum during an electoral
year and at a time when the US faced a severe crisis of legitimacy as a result
of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Darfur provided an opportunity for liberals,
who had supported the war in Iraq for humanitarian reasons,6 to reclaim
the moral high ground. Save Darfur therefore met a political context that
received its activities favourably.
Third, the leaders of the Save Darfur movement operated very skilfully,
maximizing the impact of their work through coalition building. They cre-
ated a movement, whose cause was sufficiently vague and non-menacing
to allow it to become a catch-all for various civil society groups. They
managed to tap into traditional Christian advocacy for Sudan, Jewish pre-
occupation with genocide, human rights groups’ support for international
criminal justice, the conflict resolution community’s enthusiasm for R2P,
student idealism, and the philanthropic impulse of celebrities. Finally, the
Save Darfur movement was magnified by technology and an efficient man-
agement model. Internet sites and e-mail lists were Save Darfur’s primary
mobilizing tools, allowing for a highly efficient use of resources. Students
proved particularly adept in this regard.7 Equally conducive was the decen-
tralized management of the movement: apart from a loose association within
the Save Darfur Coalition, there are no central coordinating structures, al-
lowing for maximum flexibility as well as pragmatic adaptation of the cause
to the concerns of particular constituencies. The Save Darfur movement
emerged in the US, but later spread and gained significant momentum in
Europe, in particular France and the UK.
Taking stock of Save Darfur’s achievements
The persistent lobbying of the Save Darfur movement has led govern-
ments and international organizations to react to the crisis in ways that go
beyond typical policy responses to conflicts in Africa. In what follows, I
consider different dimension of the response to the Darfur conflict shaped
by the Save Darfur movement: rhetorical, political, military, legal, and hu-
manitarian. Manifestly, the movement cannot be credited (or blamed) for
all responses. However, Save Darfur has been instrumental in explaining
the scale as well as the form of the response to the conflict. Save Darfur
has been most successful in affecting the rhetoric of governments, the most
spectacular achievement being former US Secretary of State Powell’s 2004
determination that the Darfur conflict constituted genocide. Furthermore,
6. See Alan Wolfe, ‘Empty nest: the demise of a species’, World Affairs (Winter 2009).
7. Rebecca Hamilton and Chad Hazlett, ‘“Not on our watch”: the emergence of the American
movement for Darfur’ in Alex de Waal (ed.), War in Darfur, pp. 337–66, pp. 362–3.
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the US administration has made countless references to Darfur, usually
condemning the violence and promising action; such calls were common in
countless speeches during the US presidential campaigns in 2004 and 2008.
Darfur also became a favoured topic of the French and UK governments,
epitomized in President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Brown’s joint op-ed in
The Times, advertising their commitment ‘to save the Darfuris’.8
Save Darfur not only influenced the rhetoric of policy makers, but accom-
plished real policy change, in particular in the US. The Sudan Divestment
campaign, spearheaded by student activists, was very successful, akin to the
anti-apartheid campaign targeting South Africa in the 1980s. Of particular
note was the unanimous passage in both houses of the US Congress of
the 2007 Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act, which required com-
panies applying for US government contracts to prove that they were not
conducting business in Sudan.9 The pressure was effective at the executive
level as well: in 2007, President Bush announced sanctions against high-
ranking officials of the Sudanese government and companies operating in
Sudan.10 In Europe, the results were less tangible, but the Darfur advocacy
triggered various diplomatic initiatives by European governments seeking
to put pressure on the Sudanese government. Save Darfur also targeted
China, Sudan’s most important international ally. Under the banner of the
‘Genocide Olympics’, a campaign was mounted to chastise the Chinese
government for its political support and economic relations with Sudan.11
Though resentful of the moralizing discourse of the West, China neverthe-
less responded to the campaign pressure with some policy changes, notably
appointing a special envoy and dropping its initial resistance to a robust UN
peacekeeping mission in Darfur.12
From the outset, the Save Darfur movement has advocated for a mil-
itary intervention to protect civilians in Darfur. Early on, some activists
demanded a full-fledged, non-consensual intervention by NATO like that
undertaken in Kosovo in 1999,13 but these claims were soon largely aban-
doned – a nuance that Mamdani ignores. Instead, Save Darfur advo-
cated the deployment of a large peacekeeping mission to protect civilians
8. Gordon Brown and Nicolas Sarkozy, ‘We are pushing and pushing to save the Darfuris’,
The Times, 31 August 2007, p. 19.
9. For details of the divestment campaign, see an account by two Darfur activists associated
with the Enough Project: Colin Thomas-Jensen and Julia Spiegel, ‘Activism and Darfur: slowly
driving policy change’, Fordham International Law Journal 31, 4 (2008), pp. 843–58.
10. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, ‘Bush tightens penalties against Sudan’, New York Times, 29 May
2007.
11. Helen Cooper, ‘Darfur collides with Olympics, and China yields’, New York Times,
13 April 2007.
12. Daniel Large, ‘China and the contradictions of “non-interference” in Sudan’, Review of
African Political Economy 35, 115 (2008), pp. 93–106.
13. See, for example, Eric Reeves, ‘Regime change in Sudan’, Washington Post, 23 August
2004.
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proactively, if necessary by using force. At first, this translated into support
for the African Union Mission in Darfur (AMIS). However, starting in 2005
the establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur became Save
Darfur’s most important goal, absorbing much of the movement’s energy.
A UN mission requires UN Security Council authorization (and therefore
veto power acquiescence), which resulted in protracted diplomatic negotia-
tions, culminating in the July 2007 compromise that established the UN-AU
joint mission, UNAMID.14 At the same time, European countries led by
France’s activist foreign minister Bernard Kouchner, decided to set up a
peacekeeping force – EUFOR – across the border in Eastern Chad.15
Another dimension of Save Darfur’s achievements pertains to interna-
tional criminal justice. In March 2005, after intense lobbying to overcome
US resistance, the UN Security Council referred the situation in Darfur
to the ICC.16 Save Darfur was central in this endeavour and it is clear that
had it not been for their mobilization, the referral would not have happened.
One final achievement of Save Darfur pertains to the humanitarian response
in Darfur. With over 10,000 humanitarian workers and one hundred relief
agencies, Darfur is home to the world’s largest humanitarian operation.17
The attention generated by Save Darfur undoubtedly contributes to sus-
taining this operation.
The international response to the Darfur crisis demonstrates that transna-
tional non-state actors promoting a normative project can play a significant
role in international affairs. A careful examination of the underlying con-
cepts and assumptions of the Save Darfur movement reveals three general
features of Save Darfur’s strategy which deserve attention. First, Save Darfur
focuses on external intervention to solve the conflict in Darfur, rather than
on domestic processes. This reflects an assumption of R2P, namely that
when a certain level of violence is reached, international actors must step
in and provide protection to the most vulnerable. There is therefore a ten-
dency to portray people affected by conflict as helpless victims, who need
to be saved from the outside – hence the name Save Darfur. What this ap-
proach neglects, as Mamdani rightly points out, is the recent experience of
Afghanistan and Iraq, where foreign interventions led to protracted crises
with high levels of violence.18
14. Jaı¨r van der Lijn, To Paint the Nile Blue: Factors of success and failure of UNMIS and
UNAMID (Clingendael Institute and Radbound University Nijmegen, The Hague, 2008).
15. Bjo¨rn Seibert, ‘African Adventure? Assessing the European Union’s military intervention
in Chad and the Central African Republic’ (MIT Security Studies Program working paper,
Boston, November 2007).
16. Zachary Kaufman, ‘Justice in jeopardy: accountability for the Darfur atrocities’, Criminal
Law Forum 16, 3–4 (2005), pp. 343–60.
17. Fabrice Weissman, ‘Humanitarian dilemmas in Darfur’ (Me´decins Sans Frontie`res work-
ing paper, July 2008), <http://www.msf.fr/drive/214a9aa0483c6e560e05cdafb00beb11.pdf>.
18. Mahmood Mamdani, ‘The politics of naming: genocide, civil war, insurgency’, London
Review of Books, 8 March 2007.
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Second, Save Darfur activists generally favour military over political
strategies to solve the conflict in Darfur. The lesson they learned from the
Rwandan genocide is that delaying intervention or deferring to diplomacy,
will leave many dead.19 Thus, it is not surprising that peace negotiations be-
tween the Sudanese government and the Darfur rebel movements have not
been a priority for Darfur activists. They are not opposed to peacemaking,
but Save Darfur’s strong insistence on intervention can crowd out politi-
cal conflict resolution strategies. In that sense, Mamdani is right that Save
Darfur is not a peace movement, although his claim that Darfur student
activists are ‘child soldiers’ for their support of war is exaggerated.20
Third, Save Darfur has opted for confrontational policies targeting the
Sudanese government. For most Darfur activists, the Sudanese govern-
ment bears overwhelming responsibility for armed conflict in Darfur and
other parts of Sudan. Indeed, their anti-Khartoum stance connects Dar-
fur activists with Christian groups concerned about Southern Sudan. The
strategy of Save Darfur consists of putting diplomatic, economic and moral
pressure on the Sudanese government and its allies, especially China, in
order to raise the costs of their policies. However, Save Darfur’s focus on
the Sudanese government tends to neglect the responsibility of other ac-
tors, such as rebel movements, former colonial powers, or neighbouring
countries.21 Also, confrontation may not be the best strategy to change the
Sudanese government’s policies; engagement and compromise may be more
effective, as the North–South peace process demonstrated.22
Critiquing Save Darfur
With influence comes responsibility. As Save Darfur grew as a movement,
its activism was increasingly scrutinized. The camp of sweeping critics is led
by Mamdani. For him, Save Darfur is a wolf in sheep’s clothing, concealing
its geopolitical agenda in compelling moral and humanitarian arguments.23
Save Darfur is thus a modern version of nineteenth-century colonialism, as
European powers invoked a noble mission civilisatrice to justify the subju-
gation of Africa. A more moderate and convincing critique is marshalled
by Alex de Waal: he grants that Save Darfur activists are well-intentioned
and that a movement to prevent conflict in Africa is in and of itself a good
19. Darran Brunk, ‘Dissecting Darfur: anatomy of a genocide debate’, International Relations
28, 1 (2008), pp. 25–44.
20. Mahmood Mamdani, ‘Mamdani responds to his critics II’, <http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/
darfur/2009/05/12/mamdani-responds-to-his-critics-ii/>.
21. This is a point that Mamdani makes throughout Saviours and Survivors.
22. Alex de Waal, ‘Sudan: International dimensions to the state and its crisis’ (Occasional
Paper No. 3, LSE Crisis States Research Centre, London, April 2007).
23. A similar argument is made by Steven Fake and Kevin Funk, The Scramble for Africa:
Darfur, intervention and the US (Black Rose Books, Montreal, 2009).
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thing. However, he maintains that the problem with Save Darfur is their
projection of moralistic simplicities without regard for negative side-effects
on the ground.24
While putting forward different interpretations of the motivation of Save
Darfur, critics more or less agree that advocacy efforts do have perverse
effects. In what follows, I discuss four key negative effects pertaining to
Save Darfur’s framing of the Darfur conflict and its remedies. First, Dar-
fur advocates have framed the conflict as a genocide committed by ‘Arabs’
against ‘Africans’, implying that the conflict is caused by the cultural in-
compatibility of these groups. However, the causes of the Darfur conflict
are multifaceted and include unequal distribution of land, ecological degra-
dation, Darfur’s marginalized place in the Sudanese state and nation, and
the destructive influence of regional and international powers.25 The Arab
vs African narrative brushes over such complexity. Also, the Darfur conflict
did not manifest itself as a total ethnic war, as many Arab tribes fought
each other or remained neutral – the Southern Rizeigat in South Darfur,
for example.26 By perpetuating the Arab vs African narrative, Save Darfur
has not only simplified a complex conflict, but they may have contributed
to entrenching antagonistic identities, as victims have increasingly referred
to genocide as a frame for their suffering.
Second, Darfur advocates have framed the conflict by assigning fixed eth-
nic labels: Arabs are perpetrators, who need to be punished, while Africans
are victims in need of protection.27 The danger of this narrative is that
it fosters neglect of reverse categories, such as ‘African perpetrators’ and
‘Arab victims’. Julie Flint, for example, contends that the voices of Arabs
are largely sidelined in the peace process, although their inclusion is crucial
to achieving peace in Darfur.28 Moreover, it is not so surprising that the
crimes committed by non-Arab rebel groups have not generated as much
attention as the atrocities authored by the Sudanese government and its Jan-
jaweed allies, although the recent ICC charges against three rebel leaders are
encouraging counter-examples.29 According to Mamdani, Save Darfur has
24. For more on Alex de Waal’s critique of Save Darfur, see his debate with one of the
leaders of the Save Darfur movement, John Prendergast: ‘Dueling over Darfur’, Newsweek,
<http://www.newsweek.com/id/69004>.
25. For nuanced, although different accounts of the causes of the war in Darfur, see M. V.
Daly, Darfur’s Sorrow: A history of destruction and genocide (Cambridge University Press,
New York, NY, 2007); Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Darfur: A new history of a long war
(Zed Books, London, 2008); Ge´rard Prunier, Darfur: A twenty-first century genocide, third
edition (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2008).
26. Mamdani, Saviours and Survivors, p. 16.
27. Murphy, ‘Narrating Darfur’, pp. 315–17.
28. Julie Flint, ‘Including Darfur’s Arabs in the peace process’, <http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/
darfur/2009/05/10/including-darfurs-arabs-in-the-peace-process/>.
29. Colum Lynch, ‘Rebels charged with war crimes in Sudan’, Washington Post, 18 May
2009.
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contributed to demonizing Arabs in Darfur, although paradoxically, Arab
marginalization constitutes one of the historic root causes of the conflict.
Third, Save Darfur’s insistence on humanitarian intervention has dis-
torted the expectations of Darfur rebel movements. During the Abuja peace
negotiations it fostered maximalist positions, allowing the rebels to hide be-
hind the prospect of foreign military intervention, without seriously work-
ing on a political settlement. Abdelwahid al-Nur, for example, alluding to
NATO’s intervention in the Balkans, told the mediators that he would only
sign a peace agreement if he got ‘a guarantee for implementation like in
Bosnia’.30 The insistence of advocacy groups on peace enforcement has
likewise made the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force the first priority
of the US and other states.31 This in turn led to the use of ‘deadline diplo-
macy’ to bring the Abuja talks to a premature end, depriving the parties of
their ownership of the process and producing a peace agreement that lacked
popular support and failed to be signed by all rebel factions.32
Finally, Darfur advocates have contributed to the de-politicization of con-
flict intervention by fostering a simplified understanding of armed conflict
in Africa as a story of evil villains and heroic saviours, of innocent victims
and guilty perpetrators. Armed conflict is no longer the outcome of so-
cial processes growing out of a complex history, but rather a stage for the
projection of evil. External interventions to ‘manage’ conflict thus become
virtuous efforts to fight evil, instead of politically motivated and potentially
problematic intrusions. Julie Flint eloquently remarked about Darfur advo-
cates: ‘For them, Darfur is not a place with a complex history; it’s a moral
high ground.’33
Conclusion: making sense of Save Darfur
The biggest predicament of the Save Darfur movement is its disconnec-
tion with the realities on the ground. Save Darfur emerged as a movement
in late 2004, promising to stop genocide at a time when the violence was
diminishing and the humanitarian situation in Darfur was stabilizing. Their
projection of ‘an outdated script’34 on a complex reality has had negative
side-effects, the most important of which was the international community’s
lack of focus on peace negotiations. Nevertheless, Mamdani’s assertion that
Save Darfur is a project to re-colonize Africa and demonize Arabs does
30. Quoted in Alex de Waal, ‘I will not sign’, London Review of Books, 30 November 2006.
31. Alex de Waal, ‘Darfur and the failure of the responsibility to protect’, International Affairs
83, 6 (2007), pp. 1039–54.
32. Laurie Nathan, ‘No ownership, no peace: the Darfur peace agreement’ (Working Paper
No. 5, LSE Crisis States Research Centre, London, September 2006).
33. Julie Flint, ‘Darfur, saving itself’, Washington Post, 3 June 2007.
34. Julie Flint, ‘In Sudan, help comes from above’, New York Times, 6 July 2007.
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not seem plausible. Activists are generally critical of the US government,
denouncing in particular its collaboration with the Sudanese government
in anti-terrorist matters. Moreover, the Save Darfur movement consists
of many groups that have been overwhelmingly critical of US policy in
the Middle East, including the war in Iraq, in particular NGOs based in
Europe. A few right-wing Bush-supporters are not enough to turn a move-
ment into a US government vanguard.
As a test case for the emerging norm of the responsibility to protect, Dar-
fur exemplifies the perils of blindly projecting liberal norms on a compli-
cated world. Its premise is that in the face of large-scale atrocities, passivism
is tantamount to moral bankruptcy and that action is required to prevent
and stop large-scale violence. The challenge is, in the words of Samantha
Power, to transform people from ‘bystanders’ in the face of genocide (as
in Rwanda) to ‘upstanders’ mobilizing for intervention to stop genocide.35
Many Save Darfur advocates see themselves as part of a bigger project: to
build a permanent constituency to end crimes against humanity and geno-
cide. In that sense, Darfur is more about ‘us’ than about ‘them’; it is more
about promoting liberal norms pertaining to R2P than about actually end-
ing the conflict and making peace in Darfur. Self-interest is not as such
Save Darfur’s predicament. However, their projection of a ‘humanitarian
fundamentalism’ and ‘conflict response by analogy’ ignores realities on the
ground. What seems to be most lacking from the Save Darfur repertoire is
a pragmatic assessment of their actions in order to prevent good intentions
from doing harm.36
35. See Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the age of genocide (Basic Books,
New York, NY, 2002).
36. For an argument to apply the ‘Do No Harm’ approach arising from humanitarian aid to
Darfur advocacy, see Medina Haeri, ‘Saving Darfur: Does Advocacy Help or Hinder Conflict
Resolution?’, Praxis 13 (2008), pp. 33–46, 43–4.
